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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI
LEGISLATIVE VETO:
AN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP'S EFFECT ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE




As expected, the Missouri
Supreme Court has declared the
Missouri General Assembly's legis-
lative veto power of administrative
agency rules unconstitutional.' The
U.S. Supreme Court declared
Congress' legislative veto power
unconstitutional in 1983, and since
then, many have speculated about
whether the Missouri Supreme
Court would follow suit. Accord-
ing to some, the question has been
not if, but rather when the legislative
veto would be struck down in
Missouri.' However, the Missouri
Court's treatment of the issues
involved as well as the legislature's
response to the ruling raise new
questions in the minds of environ-
mental and other special interests as
to howeffective the decision will be
and what now lies ahead.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1992, the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) proposed a new administra-
tive rule pursuant to its rulemaking
authority under the Missouri Solid
Waste Management Law
(MSWML) and submitted it to the
Secretary of State for publication.
The rule would have required those
applying for DNR permits for
landfills and waste processing
plants to document that they had
complied with all applicable zoning
and licensing requirements of the
area in which they were to be
located. The Secretary of State,
however, refused to publish the rule
because it had not been presented to
the General Assembly's Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules
(JCAR) for review, as was required
by state administrative procedure.'
The absence of JCAR review and
the refusal of the Secretary of State
to publish the rule in the Missouri
Register resulted in the failure of the
rule's formal promulgation." The
rule's failure brought one environ-
mental organization, the Missouri
Coalition for the Environment, and
some of its members to challenge
state administrative procedure re-
garding JCAR's review of pro-
posed rules.'
The Missouri Coalition for
the Environment (MCE) brought
suit in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County against various state offi-
cials ("the State") seeking a writ of
mandamus to compel the Secretary
of State to publish the rule, a
declaratory judgment pronouncing
the Missouri General Assembly's
legislative veto unconstitutional,
and an injunction to prevent JCAR
from taking further action.! MCE
'948 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1997).
'See generally Kenneth Dean,Legislative Veto ofAdministrativeRules inMissouri:A Constitutional Virus, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 1157(1992);
Scott Welman,JointConnittee onAdministrativeRules: TheMissouriLegislature'sDisregarifor theMissouri Constitution, 58UMKC
L. Rev. 113 (1989).
'See Dean, supra note 2. Professor Dean concludes his analysis stating: "At some point the right case will arise challenging the powers of
the [Joint Committee on Administrative Rules]. It should come as no surprise to anyone when those powers are ruled unconstitutional." Id.
at 1216. The Court in the instant case begins its analysis by quoting Professor Dean's comment, hinting that it was now fulfilling his
prediction. SeeMo. Coalition for theEnv't, 948 S.W.2d at 125.
"Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 129.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225 (Supp. 1990). Section 260.225.4 provides: "[n]o rule or portion of a rule promulgated under the [Missouri Solid
Waste Management Law] shall become effective until it has been approved by the joint committee on administrative rules."
Subsection 5 goes on to say: "[tihe [DNR] shall not file any final order of rulemaking with the secretary of state until twenty
days after such final order of rulemaking has been received by the committee."
The state administrative procedure act is codified at Mo. REv. STAT. Chapter 536. In 1995, legislative veto provisions
affecting many state agencies, including the DNR, were moved from their individual enabling acts to the state administrative procedure
act in § 536.024. See infra note 92.
'Id.
'Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 130-31.
'The Missouri Coalition for the Environment is a non-profit corporation, comprised of approximately 15,000 members, with its principal
office located in St. Louis, Missouri. The self-expressed purposes of the Coalition are "promoting, preserving and protecting the
environment in the State ofMissouri." Legal File at 83. The three individual relators include Karen Zurick, BeverlyToner, and Darby Tally-
-all members ofMCE.
Respondents include the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules and all of its members: State Senators Jeff Schaeperkoetter,
Franc Flotron, Emory Melton, Norman Merrell, John Schneider and Representatives Steve Carroll, Raymond Hand, David Klarich, Kaye
Steinmetz, and Vernon Thompson. The Secretary of State, Roy Blunt, the Department ofNatural Resources, and its Acting Director, Ron
Kucera, were also named as respondents.
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claimed that the Secretary of State's
refusal to publish the final version
of the regulation deprived it and
state citizens of the rule's intended
beneficial effects, including a
decrease in both noise and stench
near landfills.9 It also complained
that JCAR's broad power of review
of administrative rules crossed the
line of legislative authority-that the
General Assembly had, in effect,
granted itself executive authority-
and that JCAR was unconstitution-
ally spending taxpayer money in the
course of its duties.'0
When MCE filed its action
in 1992, the legislative veto
provisions relating to DNR rules
were surprisingly bold considering
the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment
of congressional vetoes almost ten
years earlier." Under the version of
section 260.225 in effect at the time,
the legislature empowered JCAR,
without approval from the General
Assembly, to either disapprove of a
proposed DNR rule within twenty
days after it was filed with the
Committee, or suspend any rule
already promulgated. 2 After MCE
filed suit, the legislature amended
DNR's rulemaking authority under
section 260.225 in 1993 and again
in 1995.13 On April 18, 1994, DNR
officially withdrew its final order of
rulemaking which the Secretary of
State had refused to publish."
The Circuit Court granted
JCAR's motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling the case moot since the
final order of rulemaking had been
withdrawn by DNR, the statute had
been amended since the action was
commenced, and the legislature had
not actually exercised its veto
authority."
On direct appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Court reversed,
holding that both MCE and its three
individual members had standing to
sue, that amendment of the statute
or withdrawal of the rule did not
render the case moot, and that the
case was ripe for adjudication.' 6 It
also held that the 1990 version of
section 260.225 was unconstitu-
tional, since it violated the separa-
tion of powers and presentment
requirements of the state constitu-
tion." However, the Court stressed
that the legislature is free to
authorize committees to review
regulatory actions of the executive
department and take such action as
is constitutionally allowed." In so
ruling, the Court specified that its
holding was "limited only. to the
constitutional inability of the legis-
lature to unilaterally suspend or
veto such regulatory action." 9 In
sum, the Supreme Court held that
the legislature may not, without
violating the constitution, "unilater-
ally suspend or veto" administrative




The authority of JCAR has
constantly evolved since its incep-
tion. The Committee was estab-
lished by the General Assembly in
1975 as a joint committee with five
members from each house.2' At
first, JCAR's role was merely to
review new regulations proposed by
state executive agencies and then
make recommendations to the
'Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 128.
"Id.
"See generally INS v. Chadha, infra note 44.
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4-.6 (Supp. 1990). Subsection 4 provides: "[ulpon filing any proposed rule with the secretary of state, the
department shall concurrently submit such proposed rule to the committee which may hold hearings upon any proposed rule and may
disapprove any proposed rule or portion thereof at any time."
Subsection 6 allows for suspension of any rule at any time: "[amny rule or portion ofa rule promulgated under the authority of [the
MSWML] may be suspended by the committee at any time after a hearing conducted thereon."
"While the 1993 amendment changed the JCAR's procedure ofreview, the 1995 amendment's only significant purpose was to reorganize
many legislative veto provisions into one section. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 260.225.7-.10 (Supp. 1993) and 260,225 (Supp. 1995). See also
Mo. Coalition for the Env 't, 948 S.W.2d at 129-31.
'uMo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 131.
5Id. at 131.
"Id. at 135-36.
"Id. The Court held the section unconstitutional "insofar as it purported 1) to suspend publication and promulgation of the DNR's final
orders of rulemaking for up to twenty days while the JCAR reviewed such rules- 2) to prevent promulgation and enforcement of DNR rules




"Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037.1 (Supp. 1975). The statute provides: "[tlhere is established a permanent joint committee of the general
assemblytobe known as the'Committee onAdministrative Rules', which shall be composed of five members ofthe senate and five members
of the house ofrepresentatives. The senate members of the committee shall be appointed by the president pro tem of the senate and the house
members by the speaker of the house. The appointment ofeach member shall continue during his term ofomfice as a member ofthe general
assembly unless sooner removed. No major party shall be represented by more than three appointed members from either house."
For a comprehensive history of the legislative veto in Missouri until 1992, see Dean, supra note 2 at 1161-66.
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Assembly and other state officials
based on its findings. 2 2 Thus, the
Committee was initially used only
as a "watchdog," possessing no veto
power, and able to see its recom-
mendations become reality only
through legislation or by asserting
pressure through hearings.? At this
point, JCAR's authority was not
constitutionally problematic. 24
However, this measured
authority did not remain static. The
legislature believed that the execu-
tive branch had too much control
over implementing law through
administrative rulemaking and
wanted to reign in such autonomy
by increasing its own powers of
agency oversight.25  Starting in
1979, the legislature tried to invest
JCAR with the power to lodge
complaints with the Administrative
Hearing Commission (AHC) to
challenge the validity of agency
rules. 6 Filing such a complaint
would result in the suspension of the
rule at issue until the AHC had
determined whether the rule had
violated the agency's rulemaking
authority.27 This arrangement was
not effective in producing its
desired results, however; and al-
though still on the books, these
provisions were left unutilized.28 In
1982, this grant of authority to
JCAR was finally pronounced
unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. 9 It went on to say that the
legislature, by empowering AHC to
invalidate administrative rules, was
in effect, "elevat[ing]" the Commis-
sion to the "status of a court." 0
According to the Missouri Constitu-
tion, the legislature has no power to
create courts and "cannot turn an
administrative agency into a court
by granting it power that has been
constitutionally reserved to the
judiciary."3' The legislature was
left to find another way to control
the content of agency rules.32
In 1986, the legislature
amended section 260.225 to allow
JCAR to actually disapprove of
DNR rules. 33 Two years later, the
statute was again amended to
include a provision enabling JCAR
to suspend, or essentially nullify,
any rule previously published and
promulgated under the MSWML
after it had conducted a hearing on
the rule." Thus, any previously
promulgated DNR regulation was
at risk to the whims of just a few
legislators on this key committee.
The section also included a
nonseverability clause stating that if
JCAR's "review power" were ever
held to be unconstitutional or
otherwise held invalid, DNR's
rulemaking authority as well as any
rule promulgated by it would also
be void.3 1 In 1990, the section was
amended again, but not in a way that
affected the legislative veto power
of JCAR.3
The Assembly maintained
its fervent pace, and in 1993,
revised the statute yet again, this
time after the Secretary of State
refused to publish the DNR rule at
issue and JCAR's authority was
under fire." This time, however,
the legislature effected a substantial
"Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.037.3-.4(Supp. 1975). Subsection 3 provides: "[t]he committee shall reviewall rules promulgated byanyagency....
In its review the committee may take such action as it deems necessary which may include holding hearings."
Subsection 4 provides: "[ilfthe committee finds that any rule...should be amended or rescinded in whole or in part, it shall report
such findings and recommendations to the general assembly, to the commissioner ofadministration, and to the elected state officer, if any,
who promulgated the rule."
"Dean, supra note 2, at 1162.
241d.
"See Welman, supra note 2, at 115 (citing Mo. GENERAL ASSEMBLY JOINT COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, REPORT ON THE CHANGING
SCOPE AND INCREASING WORKLOAD OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, 83rd Gen. Assembly at 3 (1986)).
"See Dean, supra note 2, at 1163, 1217-19 (examples cited by Professor Dean where the JCAR is granted authority to file complaints
include: Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 344.070 (enacted 1969; amended 1979), 198.009 (enacted 1979), and 630.050 (enacted 1980)).
1"Id.
nDean, supra note 2, at 1163.
"State Tax Comm'n v. Admin. Hearing Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). The AHC had been empowered in 1978 by the
General Assembly "to render declaratory judgments regarding the validity of agency rules." Id. at 73. The Court held that the grant of
authority from the legislature to the AHC was an "abuse that flowed from centralization of power" and hence contrary to the doctrine of
separation ofpowers because the suspension ofthe rule was a purelyjudicial remedy.
"Admin. Heaning Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 73-75.
"Id. at 76.
"Id. at 73-76. See also Mo. REv. STAT. §§161.333, 536.050 (1978).
"Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.225 (Supp. 1986).
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4 (Supp. 1988). The statute provided that"any rule orportionofa rule promulgated under [theMSWML] may
be suspended by the committee at any time after a hearing conducted thereon."
"Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.225.5 (Supp. 1988). This provision states: "[ijf the review power is held unconstitutional or invalid, the grant of
rulemaking authority and any rule promulgated under such rulemaking authority shall also be invalid or void." Id.
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225 (Supp. 1990). Most significantly, the 1990 amendment added two new sections dealing with a legislative
directive for the DNR to prepare model solid waste management plans. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.225.2-.3.
"Id.
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change, trying to legitimize and
strengthen the veto against attack by
relinquishing some of its power and
clarifying that the delegated DNR
rulemaking authority was condi-
tional. 8  JCAR's authority was
restricted in that no longer would
the Committee be allowed to
suspend any rule at any time." It
could only suspend rules within a
thirty-day time period before the
final order of rulemaking is filed
with the Secretary of State and only
upon specific, newly-specified
grounds.4 In addition, the Commit-
tee could no longer suspend DNR
regulatons unilaterally-the concur-
rence of the Senate and House of
Representatives by resolution was
now necessary for a permanent
suspension. The legislature
strengthened its grip on the veto
power by reestablishing and empha-
sizing the nonseverability clause of
the pre-amended versions.42
The legislature acted again
in 1995 to revise DNR, as well as
many other agencies', rulemaking
authorization. However, instead of
radically realtering JCAR's author-
ity, the 1995 revision was geared
toward centralization of various
legislative veto provisions in many
individual agency enabling statutes
into the state administrative proce-
dure law. The amendment repealed
the 1993 version of the veto
provisions in section 260.225 and
incorporated them into a new
section to Chapter 536, section
536.024." The amendment left
unchanged the specific require-
ments of rule suspension the 1993
amendment imposed on JCAR and
the legislature as a whole.
Traditionally, the major
argument against the legislative
veto has centered on separation of
powers. 45  The doctrine is more
carefully defined, however, in the
Missouri structure of government
than it is at the federal level. 4
Although the U.S. Constitution only
implies separation ofpowers through
its organization and delegation of
duties to each branch, the Missouri
Constitution explicitly commands
that each branch of state govern-
ment is to be separate, distinct, and
not encroach upon the authority of
the others. 7 In addition, the bounds
of the legislature are more explicitly
defined in the state constitution."
The General Assembly twice at-
tempted, by proposing constitu-
tional amendments granting it a
legislative veto, to push the consti-
tutional envelope, but both refer-
enda failed at the ballot box.4 9
The year after the Missouri
Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Administrative Hearing
Commission, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared congressional legis-
lative vetoes unconstitutional.- In
its landmark decision in INS v.
Chadha, the Court primarily relied
on the Presentment and Bicameral
Clauses of the Constitution in ruling
that legislative vetoes of one house
of Congress violated separation of
powers." Speaking for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger explained
federal separation of powers:
38Id.
9Id.
'oMo REv. STAT. § 260.225.4-.7. Subsection 7 provides: "[t]he committee may, by majority vote of the members, suspend the order of
rulemaking or portion thereof byaction takenpriorto the filing of the final order of rulemaking only for one or more of the following grounds:
(1) An absence of statutory authority for the proposed rule;
(2) An emergency relating to public health, safety or welfare;
(3) The proposed rule is in conflict with state law;
(4) A substantial change in circumstance since enactment of the law upon which the propsed rule is based" (emphasis supplied).
Mo REv. STAT. § 260.225.7.
"'Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4 (Supp. 1993).
"Id. The subsection states: "[tihe delegation of the legislative authority to enact law by the adoption of such rules is dependent upon the
power of the joint committee on administrative rules to review and suspend rules pending ratification by the senate and the house of
representatives as provided herein."
43Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.225 and 536.024 (Supp. 1995).
"Id.
Dean, supra note 2, at 1190.
"Id.
4 Dean, supra note 2, at 1190. Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § I provides: "[tihe powers ofgovernment shall be divided into three distinct departments-
-the legislative, executive and judicial--each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons,
charged with the exercise ofpowers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either
of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."
"See Mo. CoNsT. art. M, § 21: "[n]o law shall be passed except by bill." See also Mo. Coalition for the Env't. 948 S.W.2d at 134.
"Missouri Coalitionforthe Env 't, 948 S.W.2d at 129. The legislature's twoproposed amendments to the state constitution, Senate Joint
Resolution No. 29 and House Resolution No. 36 were defeated in 1976 and 1982 respectively. Id. See also Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 173.612,
197.445, and 277.160.
5INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919(1983).
"Id at 947-952. Rex Lee, the U.S. Solicitor General whoargued before theSupremeCourt inChadha, laterremarked thatthecase was"one
ofthehalf-dozen most important cases ever decided by the Supreme Court." Rex Lee, Brigham Young University constitutional law lecture
(March 1994).
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the Constitution sought to
divide the delegated powers of
the new federal go v -
ernment into three defined
categories, legislative, execu-
tive and judicial, to assure, as
nearly as possible, that each
Branch of government would
confine itself to its assigned
responsibility. The hydraulic
pressure inherent within each
of the separate Branches to
exceed the outer limits of its
power, even to accomplish
desirable objectives, must be
resisted.s2
Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that a unicameral
disapproval of administrative regu-
lations violated the doctrine of
separation of powers inherent in the
federal Constitution. With the
express statement of the Missouri
Constitution, Article II, section 1, a
Missouri court would have an easier
time ruling that such an action
would violate state separation of
powers.
The effects of Chadha
were far-reaching. Chadha appears
to require, on statutes containing
legislative veto provisions, a case-
by-case examination of whether the
veto can be severed from the rest of
the act.54  Instead of Congress
provoking a fight, it will probably
refuse to veto administrative rules
when a statute authorizes such.ss In
fact, since "the mere presence of an
unexercised legislative veto provi-
sion in a statute may invalidate" the
whole statute, because of the
severability issue, commentators
suggest it would serve the legisla-
ture well, to not only keep quiet
about its dormant legislative veto
provisions, but also amend such
laws to correct any problems
waiting to happen. '
Three years later, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Bowsher v.
Synar, again struck down a legisla-
tive encroachment upon executive
authority." Citing Chadha, the
Court held that congressionally
granted authority under Gramnm-
Rudman to the Comptroller General
was executive in nature and
unconstitutional since the Comp-
troller General could only be
removed from office by Congress.s
Again, Chief Justice Berger ex-
plained separation of legislative and
executive authority:
To permit the execution of the
laws to be vested in an officer an-
swerable only to Congress would,
in practical terms, reserve in Con-
gress control of the execution of
the laws .... The structure of the
Constitution does not permitCon-
gress to execute its laws; it fol-
lows that Congress cannot grant
to an officer under its control what
it does not possess.59
The Court explained that
allowing the Comptroller General
to act in the way Congress had
intended would be, "in essence, to
permit a congressional veto."60 In
fact, the Court added, "[this kind of
congressional control over the
execution of the laws, Chadha
makes clear, is constitutionally
impermissible. "6' According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, a
grant of authority by the legislature
to itself, or an officer under its
exclusive control, to execute the
laws is an unconstitutional violation
of separation of powers.62
Finally, in late September
1997, the Missouri Supreme Court
issued its decision in State Auditor
v. Joint Committee on Legislative
Research, in which it favorably
relied on its previous decisions in
both Administrative Hearing Com-
mission and the instant case.63 In
this case, the court determined that
the Missouri doctrine of separation
of powers as stated in Article II,
section 1 of the state constitution,
precludes action by the Joint
Committee on Legislative Research
to conduct an audit of the state
auditor's office." The court quoted
Chadha for the proposition that
separation of powers "may be
violated when one branch assumes a
[power]... that more properly is
entrusted to another."65 It also cited
its interpretation of Bowsher by
saying that "[o]nce the legislature
makes its choice in enacting
legislation, its participation ends.""
By applying Chadha and Bowsher,
"Id. at 951.
3Id.
5'NoWAK AND ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITIMONAL LAw, 5th ed. § 7.1555Y.
'
6Id.




1 d. at 726-27.
QId.
63State Auditor v. Joint Conunittee on Legislative Research, No. 79454, 1997 WL 731529 (Mo.
Sept. 30, 1997).
"Id. at *3.
6 1d. (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963).
"Id.
MELPR 97
Vol. 5 + No. 2
Missouri has indisputably stated
that the legislature is not justified in




Court in Missouri Coalition for the
Environment v. Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules ruled that
disapproval by the Missouri Gen-
eral Assembly of executive agency
administrative rules was unconstitu-
tional." It reasoned that it was a
violation of the state constitution
for the legislature to grant addi-
tional power to itself in areas
reserved for the executive branch.s6
Section 260.225 (Supp. 1990) of
the Missouri Revised Statutes
mandates prior approval of all DNR
rules by JCAR before the Secretary
of State may officially publish
them.69 The statute also authorized
JCAR to disapprove of previously
promulgated rules enacted under
MSWML and supend and withdraw
them.o As noted above, the
legislature then amended its legisla-
tive veto power in 1993 and again in
1995.
The Court first addressed
the issue of standing.7' It ruled that
the individual residents had stand-
ing for both the Secretary of State's
refusal to publish and the constitu-
tional issues at stake," The Court
reiterated its position that public
citizens, when seeking orders of
mandamus against state officials,
have a right to performance of those
officials' "ministerial duties.'" 3 It
explained by stating that where the
duty to be performed is simple,
mandated by statute, and routine,
the standing threshold for a member
of the public is "extremely low.'" 4
Since the ministerial duty at issue
was a routine one mandated by
statute, over which the Secretary
had no discretion as to compliance,
the standing requirement was satis-
fied."
The Court also ruled in
favor of standing for the individuals
to sue on the constitutional issue of
state funding of JCAR's expenses. 6
When the assembly established
JCAR, it provided that "members
of the committee ... may receive
their necessary expenses while
attending the meetings of the
committee, to be paid out of the
joint contingent fund.'" 7 As
taxpayers, the individual relators
would have standing to sue the
Committee if they alleged an
illegal, "direct expenditure of funds
generated through taxation." 8 Since
the complainants alleged that JCAR
expended funds in this manner
between 1986 and 1992, they
fulfilled the sufficiency require-
ments for standing on the constitu-
tional claim. 9
The Court found that
MCE's lobbying effort and concern
for enforcement of MSWML,
especially since the group did not
claim any "concrete injury beyond
non-implementation of its preferred
policy choices," was insufficient to
afford standing.' Alternatively, the
coalition argued associational stand-
ing, claiming that it brought the
action on behalf of its members who
resided near waste disposal areas.'
This specific claim was dismissed
as moot since the individual relators
had already been granted personal
standing.82
The Court began its discus-
sion of the constitutional claim by
establishing both its reverence for
legislative action and its authority
of judicial review.83  Quoting
Asbury v. Lombardi, it declared that
"we presume a statute is valid unless
it clearly contradicts a constitutional
provision."8 4 The court then cited
'Mo. Coalition for the Env O, 948 S.W.2d at 133-35.
"Id.
"Mo. REv. STAT. §260.225.4-.5 (Supp. 1990) provides: "[njo rule or portionofa rule promulgated under the authority of [chapter 260] shall
become effective until it has been approved by the joint committee on administrative rules.... If any proposed rule or portion thereof is
disapproved by the committee, the secretary of state shall publish in the Missouri Register... an order that such rule or portion thereofhas
been disapproved."
"Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.6 (Supp. 1990).
"Mo. Coalition for the Envt, 948 S.W.2d at 131.
721d.
"Id. (quoting State ex rel. Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. 1992)).
ulId. (quoting State ex rel. Cabool v. Texas County Bd. of Equalization, 850 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Mo. 1993)).
nId.
"Id.
"Id. (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037.5 (1975)).





'Id. (quoting Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Mo. 1993)).
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the assertion of Chief Justice
Marshall-that "it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,"
adding to that a clarifier, "to
determine the constitutionality of
statutes."85 This statement reaf-
firms the Court's judicial power to
overrule a law as unconstitutional.86
With its authority thus defined, the
Court progressed to the Missouri
separation of powers doctrine.87
According to the doctrine
of separation of powers in Missouri,
each branch of government should
be "kept as separate from and
independent from, each other as the
nature of free government will
admit, or as is consistent with that
chain of connection which binds the
whole fabric of the Constitution in
one indissoluble bond of union and
amity."" The Court also main-
tained, according to long estab-
lished interpretation of the Missouri
Constitution, that one branch was
not to encroach upon the duties of
another without express constitu-
tional mandate.89 The constitution,
the court affirmed, "peremptorily
forbids either of such departments
from passing the prohibitory pre-
cincts thus ordained by the exercise
of powers properly belonging to
either of the others."0 It then
determined that legislature's en-
croachment in authorizing JCAR
was not merely an "overlap of
powers" but a a violation of
constitutional separation of powers
in two respects.91 First, the statute
allows the legislature to "unconsti-
tutionally interfere with the func-
tions of the executive branch." 2
Second, it allows the
"circumvent[ion of] the
constitution's bill passage and
presentment requirements."9 1
On the first violation, the
court firmly pronounced that article
II, section I of the Missouri
Constitution limits the authority of
the legislature to enacting laws, as
opposed to enforcing those laws
which it has enacted.94 The court
stated that JCAR's statutory author-
ity under section 260.225 to review,
suspend publication of, and disap-
prove of DNR administrative rules,
as well as its power to suspend rules
already promulgated, is a power
reserved by the constitution to the
executive branch.95  Article IV,
sections 16 and 47 of the constitu-
tion direct that the promulgation of
rules and regulations is solely an
executive function. Once the
legislature has delegated rulemaking
powers, its control is at an end, and
is not at liberty to exercise direct
control over what rules are promul-
gated.' The Court clarified that the
legislature may, of course, exercise
its oversight function.97
On alternate grounds, the
Court invoked the passage and
presentment requirement of the
constitution to bar JCAR's action."
Since administrative rules have the
force and effect of law, it reasoned,
it is necessarily inferred that they
may only be defeated by the
legislature through subsequent law.9"
The Court then explained that since
the constitution stipulates that "no
law shall be passed [by the
legislature] except by bill," and that
every bill passed by both houses
must be presented to the Governor,
the type of legislative action in this
case failed to comply with the
constitution's passage and present-
ment requirements.' Therefore,
"Ild.
"Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137).
vId.
"Id. at 132-33 (quoting Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465,468 (Mo. 1910)).
"Id.
"Id. at 133 (quoting Albright v. Fisher, 64 S.W. 106,108-09 (Mo. 1901)). The Missouri Constitution states: "[t]he powers of government
shall be divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial-each of which shall be confided to a separate
magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."
Mo. CONST. art. II, § 1.






"Id. at 136. When established, the JCAR was authorized to hold hearings on DNR proposed rules and submit recommendations based on
its findings to the legislature and executive officials. Naturally, the General Assembly could act in accordance with the Committee's
recommendations through legislation. In this process, even though legislation might not be proposed, pressure could be effectively asserted
on the DNR to withdraw or modify its proposed rule, especially pressure brought by an appropriations committee to curtail or qualify agency
funding or another committee to hold hearings, delay appointments, etc. The Court maintained that these oversight procedures are
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the Court pronounced, "legislative
actions.. .cannot amend, modify,
rescind, or supplant any rule
promulgated by an agency unless
the legislature follows the bill
passage requirements."o'0 Since an
action by the legislature to suspend
an administrative rule is necessarily
a legislative action, it is subject to
the constitutional mandates for bill
passage.' 2
The next issue the Court
had to face was justiciability. JCAR
asserted that the case was mooted
by either the fact that the statute was
amended or by the withdrawal of
the final order of rulemaking by
DNR. 03 The Court found this
argument unpersuasive in spite of
the trial court's ruling.'" It
elaborated that the statute, as
amended in 1995, did not "elimi-
nate that nature of the controversy
alleged." 0 The court explained
that the amended version still
allowed for violation of the
constitution's passage and present-
ment requirements, in that it
provided for a thirty-day suspen-
sion and a complete veto upon
action by the legislature without
presentment of such action to the
govemor.'0" In short, the Court
maintained that "a case is not
mooted when the controversy
continues regardless of the amend-
ment. Here, essentially the same
constitutional infirmity infects both
the earlier and later versions of the
statute."'10 The case for mandamus
was also not mooted, the court
added, because once the Secretary
of State improperly refused to
publish the order, "the rule was, for
purposes of this litigation, promul-
gated."'" Since it was promul-
gated, section 536.021.5 mandated
that it could only be withdrawn by a
"subsequent order of rulemaking
that is first published as a proposed
rule, permitted to be commented
on," and published.'" Thus, a
proposed rule cannot be withdrawn
by an agency, alleging a mistake
was made, without following the
proper procedure of section
536.021."1o
The Court then examined
the issue of ripeness, summarily
dismissing respondents' claim that
since JCAR had taken no action
against the proposed regulation, the
case was not ripe for adjudica-
tion."' Like individual standing,
this issue also failed to obstruct a
decision on the merits."' 2 In short,
the court asserted, JCAR's inaction
was not at issue."' What did matter
was not JCAR's action or inaction,
but the Secretary of State's refusal
to publish the rule based upon
section 260.225."4 Thus, the court
found the case was indeed ripe with
respect to the rule's promulga-
tion." 5
The Court did not elaborate
on the question of severability. It
acknowledged that subsection 7 of
260.225 seems to make the relation-
ship between agency rulemaking
authority and legislative review of
agency rules interdependent." 6 In
fact, the statute provides that section
260.225's grant of authority to
JCAR is "nonseverable" with the
legislature's delegation of authority
to executive agencies to promulgate
regulations."' However, the Court
interpreted the "review power" of
JCAR not necessarily as a legisla-
tive veto power, but as the general
power inherent in the legislature to
review the agencies it creates."
Thus, since the legislature contin-
ued to wield oversight authority












"'See Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.7(Supp. 1990) which states: "[t]he provisions of this section are nonseverable and the grant of rulemaking
authority is essentially dependent on the reviewpower vested with the committee. Ifthereviewpowerisheldunconstitutional or invalid, the
grant ofrulemaking authority and any rule promulgated under such rulemaking authority shall also be invalid or void."
"'Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 136.
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out a legislative veto power, the
Court reasoned that severability
was not an issue."'9
V. COMMENT
In assessing the likely
outcome of the instant decision on
Missouri, Chadha's effect on the
federal government may provide
guidance. Chadha has had its
critics, Justice White and then-
Justice Rehnquist chief among
them, and there is no doubt that the
instant decision can be criticized in
the same way.12 0 Some argue that
Chadha has had a negative effect on
not only the federal administrative
state, but also constitutional separa-
tion of powers as well.'21 The
wisdom of the instant decision, like
that of Chadha, largely depends
upon its future effects on the
constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers in Missouri.
The likely effect of the
instant decision on Missouri law has
been, and will continue to be,
immense. The state administrative
state, not to mention the balance of
power within state government has
and will still be significantly
affected. Missouri has endowed
JCAR with extensive authority-
more, in fact, than any other state.'22
Thus, other states, who might have
looked on Missouri as the last great
bastion of legislative supremacy
over the administrative state, are
now likely to see the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision as the
comet that will cause the inevitable
extinction of the legislature's behe-
moth dinosaur. A ripple effect
throughout the states is almost
certain to result.
The effect of the decision
may reverberate loudly at home too.
No doubt, JCAR's previously
unchecked power has had a chilling
effect on the rules agencies promul-
gate. In particular, the DNR may
have thought twice before promul-
gating a rule that would have a
negative fiscal impact on the
University of Missouri's coal-
burning power plant, for instance,
when a former university curator, or
a likewise interested legislator, sat
on JCAR. Now that the Supreme
Court has removed this potential
hurdle to administrative action, the
DNR and other agencies should feel
the relief of no longer having to
worry about the General Assembly's
"fooled you!" mentality regarding
delegation of rulemaking authority.
Like Chadha, the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision will
almost certainly have its detractors.
Perhaps the most volatile issue the
Court explained away in its opinion
was severability. The Court
interpreted JCAR's "review power"
as the general power within the
legislature as a whole to review and
exert oversight on executive agen-
cies.' 2  This is an intentional
misreading of the statute in order to
avoid the consequences of the
legislature's condition. Even if the
Court could honestly say it believed
the legislature intended this general
meaning of review power, it had
only to look to the even clearer
language of its 1993 amendment,
"
9While its interpretation ofthe severability provision may have been justified in past versions ofthe statute, more recent developments tend
to demonstrate that the legislature did, in fact, intend to make its delegation ofauthority to agencies dependent upon an operable legislative
veto power. In its legislative session since the Court's ruling in Mo. Coalition for the Env 't, the General Assembly has amended its
Administrative Procedure and Review statute. The amendment inserted thirteen new sections in lieu ofseven sections which it repealed.
Most relevant to the subject of this Note, § 536.024 (relating to filing requirements with the JCAR) was modified and § 536.028 (relating
to severability, etc.) was created. While the filing requirements ofagency rules with the JCAR remained unchanged, the guidelines the JCAR
is to follow in disapproving rules was moved to § 536.028. The JCAR was also directed to file its recommendations specifically with the
appropriations committees of both houses.
Most significant in the amendment are the waiting period and presentment requirements imposed by §
536.028.8-,9, directing the Secretary of State to withhold publication of the final order ofrulemaking until 30 days after the JCARhas made
its recommendations regarding the rule to the General Assembly. If the Assembly passes a resolution regarding the rule, the rule is held in
limbo until the resolution is presented to and approved or rejected by the Governor.
The amendment also adds clarification and emphasis on severability and legislative intent. Section 536.028.1 declares: "[t]he
delegation of authority to any state agency to propose to the general assembly rules as provided under this section is contingent upon the
agency complying with the provisions ofthis chapter and this delegation oflegislative power to the agency.-.is contingent and dependent upon
the power of the general assembly to review such proposed order ofrulemaking.. and to disapprove and annul any rule or portion thereof
contained in such order of rulemaking." Section 536.028.10 further explains: "[tihe provisions of this section [and agency rulemaking
authority] are nonseverable and the delegation of legislative authority to an agency to propose orders ofrulemaking is essentially dependent
upon the powers vested with the general assembly as provided herein. If any of the powers vested with the general assembly or the joint
committee on administrative rules to review...or to disapprove and annul a rule or portion ofa nmle contained in an order ofrulemaking, are
held unconstitutional or invalid, the purported grant ofrulemaking authority and any rule so proposed...shall be revoked and shall be null,
void and unenforceable."
See generally, H.B. No. 850, 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 1997).
'See generally, Chadla, 462 U.S. 919.
"'See generally, Robert F. Nagel, The Legislative Veto, the Constitution, and the Courts, 3 CoNsT. Comeirr 61 (1986).
'
22See Dean, supra note 2, at 1215.
'
23See supra note 37.
MELPR 101
Vol. 5 * No. 2
where the legislature replaced the
words "review power" with "the
power of the joint committee on
administrative rules to review and
suspend rules pending ratification
by the [General Assembly]." 24
Clearly, the legislature intended its
review power to specifically refer to
the legislative veto.'
Aside from the opinion's
internal reasoning problems, lack of
legislative veto power itself may be
detrimental. While the members of
the Missouri Supreme Court all
concurred in their judgment, those
on the U.S. Supreme Court did not
and voiced their concerns for
canceling Congress' veto authority.
In particular, Justice White's dis-
sent in Chadha decried the over-
turning of the veto provision.'26 In
his now-famous words, White
declared that the Court had gone too
far, for not only did it invalidate one
provision of federal statute, it
"sound[ed] the death knell for
nearly 200 other statutory provi-
sions in which Congress has
reserved a legislative veto."127 This,
he believed, was incomprehensible.
In Missouri, the legislature
had reserved to itself a legislative
veto in almost 180 statutes.'12
However, the fate of these statutes is
slightly different from their federal
counterparts; for while legislative
vetoes still lurk in congressional
statutes, they have been economi-
cally stricken from the Missouri
administrative environment. Even
though the Missouri Supreme Court
held that a presumption of validity
in statutes remains, and a statute will
not be stricken absent clear contra-
diction with the Missouri Constitu-
tion, Missouri legislators have
received notice that this is such a
case and they will lose if they try
again.129
In the wake of the Court's
ruling, the legislature must now
decide how to proceed without its
powerful check on executive agen-
cies. As Congress did after
Chadha, the Missouri legislature
must now confront new decisions.
It must decide whether to legislate
"more clumsily," keeping its del-
egation of rulemaking authority to
executive agencies inordinately nar-
row or rigid.o30 In addition, it must
also decide whether to be deterred
in its delegation of rulemaking
authority in the future, or on the
contrary, whether to grant broad
authority and, in essence, "pass the
buck" to the executive branch.'3 1 It
must now decide how to shape its
future method of delegation and
how vigorously to pursue its other
oversight capabilities. In the face of
the legislature's amendment of the
statute since the Court's decision,
the Court will likely be forced to
revisit the issue fairly soon.3 2
VI. CoNCLUSION
Fourteen years after
Chadha, the Missouri Supreme
Court has finally declared the
legislative veto in Missouri uncon-
stitutional. It has pronounced that
the unilateral declaration by the
legislature, without presentment to
the Governor and hence not by
legislation, voiding an executive
agency rule violates separation of
powers. But the fact that the Court
struck down the 1990 version of the
legislative veto leaves doubts as to
whether subsequent versions of the
veto are also unconstitutional,
particularly the 1997 amendment
requiring a mandatory waiting
period and presentment to the
Governor if the General Assembly
adopts JCAR's recommendation. If
the judiciary is called upon to face
this issue again, the new face and
structure of the veto provisions and
reinvigorated obstacles like sever-
ability may prove more problematic
for it to overcome.
'14See Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.225.4 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis supplied).
"'See supm notes 90 and 92 for further clarification of the legislature's intent on severability.
u'Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J. dissenting).
127 g.
"Dean, supra note 2, at 1157.
Mo. Coalition for the Env't, 948 S.W.2d at 132.
"'Nagel, supra note 94, at 62-63.
131Id.
'In addition to strengthening nonseverability, theAssemblyhas ostensiblycountered the Court's Presentment Clause argument by requiring
all disapproval resolutions to be presented to the Governor. See supra note 92.
102 MELPR
